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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hears appeals "from the district court
involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to divorce, annulment,
property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity..."
pursuant to section 78-2a-3(h) of the Utah Code (1953).
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Issue One: Whether a Utah District Court has proper subject matter jurisdiction to modify
the child support provisions of a California divorce decree if the mother and children live in
Utah, and if the father lives in Maryland but is subject to personal jurisdiction in Utah.

Issue Two: Whether the trial court having proper subject matter jurisdiction acted properly
in granting Mrs. Case's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure when Mr. Case completely failed to respond to the motion.

Issue Three: Whether pursuant to section 78-45-7.2(3) of the Utah Code, which allows the
court to deviate from the requirements of the child support provisions if the result would be
"unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interests of the child," the district court ruled
properly in not requiring a showing of substantial change in circumstances when it
established child support for Mrs. Case in light of the fact that the parties (1) "reserved" the
issue of child support in their initial divorce decree and (2) stipulated in the decree that no
change of circumstances would be required for a subsequent support order.
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Standard of Review: Questions involving an interpretation of law (such as whether
summary judgment is proper) should be reviewed for correctness; however, questions
involving change in circumstances are generally reviewed on an abuse of discretion
standard except where it is a question of law. Krambule v. Krambule, 994 P.2d 210, 213
(UtahCt.App. 1999).
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. & RULES

CONSTITUTION:
UTAH CONST. ART.

VII § 5. See Brief of Appellant, Addendum.

STATUTES
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 30-3-3 (1953). See Brief of Appellee, Addendum.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-2a-3 (1953), Court of Appeals Jurisdiction. See Brief of

Appellant, Addendum.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-3-4(1) (1953), stating, "The district court has original

jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not
prohibited by law."
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-45-6 (1953), Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, stating,

"The district court shall have jurisdiction of all proceedings brought under this act."
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-45f-201(1953), Bases for jurisdiction over nonresident. See

Brief of Appellant, Addendum.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-45f-202 (1953), Procedure when exercising jurisdiction over

nonresident, stating, "A tribunal of this state exercising personal jurisdiction over a
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nonresident under Section 78-45f-201 may apply Section 78-45f-316 to receive evidence
from another state, and Section 78-45f-318 to obtain discovery through a tribunal of another
state. In all other respects, Parts 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 do not apply and the tribunal shall apply
the procedural and substantive law of this state, including the rules on choice of law other
than those established by this chapter."
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-45f-203 (1953), Initiating and responding tribunal of state,

stating, "Under this chapter, a tribunal of this state may serve as an initiating tribunal to
forward proceedings to another state and as a responding tribunal for proceedings initiated
in another state.''
UTAH CODE ANN

§78-45f-304 (1953), Duties of initiating tribunal. See Brief of

Appellee, Addendum.
UTAH CODE ANN

§78-45 f-305 (1953), Duties of responding tribunal. See Brief of

Appellee, Addendum.
UTAH CODE ANN

§78-45f-611(1953), Modification of child support order of another

state. See Brief of Appellant, Addendum.

RULES:
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Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Brief of Appellant, Addendum.
Rule 4-501, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, repealed. See Brief of Appellant,
Addendum.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Mr. and Mrs. Case were married on December 18, 1992, in California. During the
course of their marriage, they had two children, Tanissa Noel who was born in 1994 and
Nicholas Lloyd who was born in 1998. Record at 4-5. The parties obtained a divorce
decree in California in 2002, although Mrs. Case and the children had relocated to Utah and
Mr. Case had relocated to Maryland. Record at 7 and 9.
Mr. and Mrs. Case's divorce decree gave Mrs. Case full custody of the minor
children, but gave her nothing for child support. Record at 8-12 and 97-104. The Decree
stated "Child support is ordered as set forth in the attached Marital settlement agreement.. .
[and] Attachment 4.0." Record at 8. In Attachment 4.0 of the Decree, the issue of child
support was "reserved" until one of four events occur, the fourth event being "further order
of the court." Record at 103. The parties' marital settlement agreement stated that "if the
child support awarded is less than the mandatory minimum level, no change of
circumstances need be demonstrated to obtain a modification of the child support award to
the applicable minimum level or above (emphasis added)." Record at 103-104. As such,
Mrs. Case rightfiilly knew that although she did not insist upon an award of child support at
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the time of her divorce, that she would be able to have the court address the issue at a later
date without a change in circumstances. After being divorced for approximately one year,
and having been forced to accept governmental assistance, and realizing that she could not
continue to support the children on her own, Mrs. Case decided to petition the Utah Court
for establishment of reasonable child support. Record at 5.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS:
Mrs. Case filed her Petition with the Utah District Court in March 2003. Record at
4. Mrs. Case tried to get Mr. Case to accept service in Maryland of the Summons and
Complaint. However, he would not and Mrs. Case had to have a sheriff serve Mr. Case
with process. Record at 16. Mr. Case then filed an Answer to the Complaint in which he
entered a general appearance and submitted to the personal jurisdiction of the Utah District
Court. Record at 17-20. Subsequently, in August 2003, Mrs. Case filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment with an attached Affidavit and Memorandum, which was mailed to Mr.
Case on August 19, 2003. Record at 63. Mr. Case did not respond to the motion in any
way, and weeks after the motion was submitted, the Court properly granted Petitioner
Summary Judgment due to Mr. Case's failure to respond or object to the motion. Record at
68-69.
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On October 1, 2003, Mr. Case filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment with an
accompanying memorandum. Record at 80-110. Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Rules of
Judicial Administration and Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Mrs. Case had
until October 20th to respond to the Motion. However, Mr. Case mailed his Notice to
Submit to the Court on October 17th. Record at 111-112. Despite this, Mrs. Case was not
prejudiced because she had her Memorandum in Opposition submitted to the court early on
October 16th. Record at 82-110. The court denied Mr. Case's Motion for Relief from
Judgment on October 22, 2003. Record at 113-116. Although Mr. Case complains that the
court ruled on his motion before he had a chance to submit his reply memorandum, he fails
to point out that the reason the court ruled on the motion was because he hastily mailed his
notice to submit before Mrs. Case's response time was up. Record at 111-112.
DISPOSITION:
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Mrs. Case on October 22,
2003. Record at 121-124 and 135-138. The judgment awarded Mrs. Case reasonable child
support in the amount of $530 per month. Record at 136. Mr. Case has now appealed this
judgment ordering him to pay child support for his children. Record at 146-147.
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1. Mr. and Mrs. Case were married on December 18, 1992, in California. During
the course of the marriage, the parties conceived two children. They are Tanissa Noel who
was born in 1994 and Nicholas Lloyd who was born in 1998. Record at 4-5.
2. The parties obtained a divorce decree (Judgment of Dissolution) in the Superior
Court of Stanislaus County, California in 2002. Record at 7-8.
3. At the time the parties received their divorce, Mrs. Case and the children had
already relocated to Utah and Mr. Case had already relocated to Maryland. The parties
provided for this in their decree. Record at 9.
4. Mr. and Mrs. Case's divorce decree gave Mrs. Case full custody of the parties'
minor children. Record at 8-11.
5. However, the parties divorce decree gave Mrs. Case nothing by way of child
support. The Decree on page two stated "Child support is ordered as set forth in the
attached Marital settlement agreement... [and] Attachment 4.0." Record at 8.
6. In Attachment 4.0 of the Decree, the issue of child support is "reserved" until one
of four events occur, the fourth event being "further order of the court." Record at 11-12.
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7. The parties' marital settlement agreement, which was incorporated into the
decree, stated that "if the child support awarded is less than the mandatory minimum level,
no change of circumstances need be demonstrated to obtain a modification of the child
support award to the applicable minimum level or above (emphasis added)." Record at
103-104.
8. After being divorced for approximately one year, and after having been forced to
accept governmental assistance from the State of Utah, and realizing that she could not
continue to support the children on her own, Mrs. Case petitioned the Utah Court for
establishment of reasonable child support. Record at 5 and 29-45.
9. Mrs. Case filed her Petition with the Utah District Court in March 2002. Record
at 4.
10. Mrs. Case sent her Petition and Summons directly to Mr. Case initially and tried
to get him to accept service in Maryland. However, Mr. Case refused and Mrs. Case had to
have a sheriff serve Mr. Case with process, which occurred on April 17, 2003. Record at
16.
11. Mr. Case then filed an Answer to the Complaint in which he entered a general
appearance and submitted to the personal jurisdiction of the Utah District Court. Mr. Case
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does not protest that the State of Utah does have personal jurisdiction over him. Mr. Case
mailed his Answer to Mrs. Case on May 20, 2003. Record at 17-20.
12. In August 2003, Mrs. Case filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with an
attached Affidavit and Memorandum, which was mailed to Mr. Case on August 19, 2003.
Mr. Case did not respond to the motion in any way, and twenty-two days after the motion
was submitted, the Court properly granted Petitioner Summary Judgment due to Mr. Case's
failure to respond or object to the motion. Record at 80-116.
13. While it is true that in her Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, Mrs. Case cited custody statute instead of the child support statute as the
jurisdictional basis, Mr. Case did not object to this analysis at the time. Record at 23-25.
14. On October 1, 2003, Mr. Case filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment with an
accompanying memorandum. Record at 70-81.
15. In his Memorandum for Relief from Judgment, Mr. Case pointed out that Mrs.
Case cited the custody instead of the child support statute. But then he erroneously argued
that section 78-45f-611 of the Utah Code took subject matter jurisdiction away from the
district court to hear the support matter. Record at 73-74.
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16. Mr. Case also argued in his Memorandum supporting relief that summary
judgment was improper because his Answer raised issues of fact. Mr. Case suggested that
the assertions contained in his Answer should have excused his failure to respond to the
Motion for Summary Judgment. Record at 75.
17. Mr. Case also argued that the district court erred in setting child support because
Mrs. Case did not make a showing of substantial change in circumstances, despite the
provision in his divorce decree that "reserved" the issue of child support and further stated
no change in circumstances would be required for establishment of child support in the
future. Record at 76-77.
18. Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Rules of Judicial Administration and Rule 6 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Mrs. Case had until October 20th to respond to the Motion.
However, Mr. Case mailed his Notice to Submit to the Court on October 17th. Despite this,
Mrs. Case was not prejudiced because she had her Memorandum in Opposition submitted to
the court early on October 16th. Record at 82-112.
19. Mrs. Case countered all of Mr. Case's arguments in her Memorandum in
Opposition. Mrs. Case explained in her memorandum that the Utah district court had
proper jurisdiction over the matter and Respondent and that the section cited by Mr. Case
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(section 78-45f-611, which he argued took subject matter jurisdiction away from the court)
did not apply to this case. This issue is argued again in this appeal. Record at 87.
20. Mrs. Case also addressed Mr. Case's change of circumstances concern and
pointed out that the parties' divorce decree specifically states that she would not be required
to make such a showing to establish child support. This issue is also discussed again in this
appeal. Record at 89-90.
21. Finally, Mrs. Case addressed the issue of whether the entry of summary
judgment was proper, concluding that both statutory authority and case law permit entry of
summary judgment when the responding party does not respond. Case law, Mrs. Case
pointed out, forbids Mr. Case from relying on the allegations or denials in his pleadings to
create an issue of fact in the summary judgment context. This issue is also discussed again
in this appeal. Record at 90-93.
22. The court ruled in favor of Mrs. Case and denied Mr. Case's Motion for Relief
from Judgment on October 22, 2003. Record at 113-116.
23. Although Mr. Case complains that the court ruled on his motion before he had a
chance to submit his reply memorandum, he fails to point out that the reason the court ruled
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on the motion was because he hastily submitted it for decision before Mrs. Case's response
time was up. Record at 111-112.
24. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Mrs. Case on October
22, 2003. The judgment awarded Mrs. Case reasonable child support in the amount of $530
per month. Record at 136.
25. Mr. Case appealed this judgment ordering him to pay child support for his
children on November 18, 2003. Record at 146-147.
26. Subsequent to the appeal, Mrs. Case filed a Motion for Summary Disposition in
January 2004, and Mr. Case subsequently filed a response Memorandum that same month.
In the parties' Memorandums, they again addressed the same or similar issues that were
addressed on Mr. Case's Motion for Relief from Judgment.
27. The Court of Appeals denied Mrs. Case's Motion for Summary Disposition on
February 9, 2003 stating that it would defer ruling pending full briefing and consideration
by the court.
28. Mr. Case subsequently submitted his Brief, mailing it to Mrs. Case on March 10,
2003. Mr. Case's reply brief addresses the same or similar issues that were previously
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presented in his Motion for Relief from Judgment and again in Mrs. Case's Motion for
Summary Disposition.
29. Mrs. Case now responds to Mr. Case's appeal.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

POINT ONE: The Utah District Court has proper subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
statute and case law that grants the court "broad" jurisdiction to hear matters relating to
child support. Although Mr. Case argues that section 78-45f-611 of the Utah Code
eliminates subject matter jurisdiction in this matter, his argument is incorrect because said
statute does not apply pursuant to section 78-45f-202 because personal jurisdiction is
attained over Mr. Case.

POINT TWO: The trial court acted properly in granting Mrs. Case's motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when Mr. Case
completely failed to respond to the motion.

POINT THREE: Pursuant to section 78-45-7.2(3) of the Utah Code, which allows the
court to deviate from the requirements of the child support provisions if the result would be
"unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interests of the child," the district court ruled
properly in not requiring a showing of substantial change in circumstances when it
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established child support for Mrs. Case in light of the fact that the parties (1) "reserved" the
issue of child support in their initial divorce decree and (2) stipulated in the decree that no
change of circumstances would be required for a subsequent support order.
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE: A Utah District Court has proper subject matter jurisdiction to modify
the child support provisions of a California divorce decree if the mother and children
live in Utah, and if father lives in Maryland but is subject to personal jurisdiction in
Utah.
The first issue presented by Mr. Case is whether the Utah District Court has proper
subject matter jurisdiction to address a support order originating from California when the
mother and children have relocated to Utah and the father has relocated to Maryland and
both parties are subject to personal jurisdiction in Utah. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to
a "court's power to hear and determine cases of the general class or category to which
proceedings in question belong; the power to deal with the general subject matter involved
in the action." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY WITH PRONUNCIATIONS 1425 (6th ed. 1990). Both
Utah statutes and case law emphatically hold that a Utah District Court does have subject
matter jurisdiction to hear cases involving child support, like in the case at bar.
Statutory authority clearly grants the District Court subject matter jurisdiction over
child support matters. Both the Utah Code and the Utah Constitution specify that the
District Court has "original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this constitution
or by statute (emphasis added)." UTAH CONST. ART. VII § 5; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3-4(1)
(1953). In addition, the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, which has been adopted
by Utah in title 78, chapter 45 of the Utah Code, specifically grants the "district court"
subject matter jurisdiction to hear "allproceedings brought under this act (emphasis
24

added)." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-6 (1953). In the case at hand, Appellee sought the
District Court to establish a child support award for her children. Because the Act states
that the District Court has jurisdiction over child support matters, Appellee brought her
action for child support in the correct court.
In addition, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that Utah District Courts have proper
subject matter jurisdiction to hear cases involving child support for children living within
Utah. This is demonstrated in State of Utah v. Child Support Enforcement. 888 P.2d 690
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). In that case, a private child support collection agency filed an action
in a Utah Circuit Court (not the District Court) to collect a child support debt. See id. at
691. The sole issue was "whether a circuit court [as opposed to a District Court] has
subject matter jurisdiction over actions to collect past due child payments ordered by the
district court." Id In deciding that child support debts may not be collected in the circuit
court, the Court of Appeals held that "it is the district court, not the circuit court, that has
exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to divorce, child custody, paternity, and child
support." Id at 692. Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court was reversed and
vacated, as the District Court was the proper court having subject matter jurisdiction over
the child support issue and the case originated from a circuit court. See id. at 693-4.
Mr. Case argues that since the Court of Appeals dismissed the case in State of Utah
v. Child Support Enforcement, that the case at hand should also be dismissed. This is an
incorrect analysis. Mrs. Case did not get her award of support from a circuit court. She
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received it from a District Court. As such, Appellee received her judgment from the court
with proper subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, Appellant's argument fails.
Other authority also determines that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction
to hear a matter such as the case at bar. The Restatement of the Law states that, "[a] state
has legislative jurisdiction to impose upon one person a duty to support another person if (a)
the person to be supported is domiciled within the state and the person to support is subject
to the jurisdiction of the state." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 457. Here,
Mrs. Case and the children are domiciled in Utah and Mr. Case is subject to personal
jurisdiction in Utah. Therefore, subject matter jurisdiction is proper.
Mr. Case argues that the Utah Code. § 78-45f-611(1953) (which is contained in
Utah's Uniform Interstate Family Support Act or UIFSA) takes subject matter jurisdiction
away from the district court as applied to the case at bar. Mr. Case's argument is entirely
incorrect. A brief explanation of UIFSA will help explain why Mr. Case's argument is
incorrect:
A main reason that UIFSA was created was to assist child support obligees (like
Mrs. Case and the children who live in Utah) obtain support orders from obligors who live
in other states (like Mr. Case who lives in Maryland). ARNOLD H. RUTKIN, FAMILY LAW
AND PRACTICE,

Vol. 5, § 48.01 (2003). In order for a state court to impose a child support

obligation, the state court must have personal jurisdiction over the obligor parent, which can
be difficult to do if the obligor lives in another state. See id. at 48-4. In response to this
dilemna, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws created the
26

UIFSA, which replaced the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Act. Id. at 48-11. UIFSA has
been adopted by Utah states and is contained in title 78 , chapter 45f of the Utah Code.
UIFSA authorizes two types of child support proceedings depending on whether or
not personal jurisdiction is obtained on the obligor in the obligee's state. See UTAH CODE
ANN. 78-45JF-201, et seq. (1953). See also Rutkin at 48-38. The first type of proceeding
under UIFSA can be referred to as a "one-state" proceeding. Under a "one-state"
proceeding, UIFSA enables obligee parents to obtain support orders in the obligee's own
state if personal jurisdiction is obtained over the obligor (this can be done through
traditional methods like service of process in the state, or the obligor entering a general
appearance).

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-45f-201. Additionally, to give further effect to the

"one-state" procedure, UIFSA also "contains an expansive long-arm provision that allows a
state to assert jurisdiction over a non-resident and process the case locally." See Rutkin at
48-38.
The second type of proceeding under UIFSA is a "two-state" proceeding. See
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-45f-203. A "two-state" proceeding is utelized when personal

jurisdiction cannot be obtained over the obligor parent in the obligee's state. See Rutkin
at 48-39. In such a situation, the initiating tribunal of the obligee involves the tribunal of
the obligor's state as a responding tribunal. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45f-304 to -5.
The responding tribunal may then properly assert personal jurisdiction over the obligor to
obtain a support order. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45f-305. See also Rutkin at 48-11,
27

48-12, 49-38. As such, UIFSA provides authority for two different situations: (1) when
only one state will be involved (if personal jurisdiction over the obligor is obtained in the
obligee's state) and (2) when two states will be involved (if personal jurisdiction over the
obligor is not obtained in the obligee's state). See id.
In order to have proper jurisdiction to grant support under UIFSA using the "onestate" method (as was done in the instant case), the obligee's state (Utah) must have
personal jurisdiction over the obligor. See id. At 48-17 (citing Parker v. Parker, 593
S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980). The requirement for personal jurisdiction was satisfied
in the instant case through Mr. Case's entrance of a general appearance when he filed his
Answer. UTAH CODE ANN. 78-45f-201(2). As such, it was proper for Utah to hear the
case under the "one-state" method. In hearing this case, the Utah District Court had
proper subject matter jurisdiction through statute and case law as previously discussed.
A case on point is Burnham v. Superior Court. 495 U.S. 604 (1990). In that case,
the father lived in New Jersey, but was personally served in California (the wife's state of
residence) with his wife's divorce complaint. See id. When the husband was served with
process, he was temporarily in California to visit the children and conduct business. See
id. The Supreme Court held that by obtaining personal jurisdiction over the husband, the
California Court obtained proper jurisdiction to make all orders concerned in the divorce.
See id. Similarly, in the case at hand, since the Utah Court has proper personal
jurisdiction over Mr. Case through the entry of his general appearance, Utah has proper
jurisdiction to enter child support orders.
28

Mr. Case argues that the District Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to
order child support in this case and he cites section 78-45f-611 of the Utah Code to
support his argument. This statute addresses modification of child support orders of other
states when a "two-state" proceeding is going to be used. As such, this statute only
applies if personal jurisdiction is not obtained over the obligor in the obligee's state. See
Rutkin at 48-53. Under the "two-state" proceeding, a state may serve as "either an
initiating or responding tribunal." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45f-203. It is the responding
tribunal that may obtain personal jurisdiction over the respondent." See Rutkin at 48-53.
This is why § 78-45f-611 contains certain requirements (for example, it requires that the
petitioner be a non-resident and the respondent be subject to personal jurisdiction, or that
all of the parties have filed written consents). § 78-45f-611 contemplates a situation
where a support order is coming in to Utah from an initiating tribunal of another state and
Utah is the responding tribunal.
Through § 78-45f-611, two state courts may work together to resolve the support
issue because the initiating tribunal does not have personal jurisdiction but the responding
tribunal does have personal jurisdiction. This is why § 78-45f-611 does not apply in the
case at bar. Mr. Case exhaustively argues that § 78-45f-611 takes subject matter
jurisdiction away from the District Court. However, this an incorrect argument and goes
to demonstrate Mr. Case's misunderstanding of UIFSA. § 78-45f-611 works only when a
second tribunal is brought into the case to obtain personal jurisdiction over the respondent
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when personal jurisdiction cannot be obtained through traditional or long-arm methods.
Accordingly, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45f-611 does not apply to the case at bar.
§ 78-45f-202 of the Utah Code further clarifies that § 78-45f-611 does not apply in
a "one-state" proceeding such as this. It states that if a "tribunal of this state [is]
exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident under Section 78-45f-201 [which
allows personal jurisdiction if a respondent has entered a general appearance, as is the
case here]... [p]arts 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 do not apply . .." The reason the other parts do not
apply is because those provisions relate to a "two-state" proceeding. The additional
provisions are irrelevant if the action involved is a "one-state" proceeding. § 78-45f-611
is contained in Part 6 and therefore does not apply in this case. This argument has been
presented previously to Mr. Case and he has never addressed it - opting instead to ignore
this section of the Code.
Mr. Case cites Department of Human Services v. Jacoby to attempt to bolster his
argument that § 78-45f-611 takes subject matter jurisdiction from the district court. 975
P.2d 939 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). In Jacoby, the husband and wife were divorced in
Virginia. Id at 941. At the time of the divorce, the husband lived in Virginia and the
wife lived in Pennslyvania. IdL Due to the wife living in Pennslyvania at the time of the
divorce, the Virginia court transferred child support matters to the Pennsylvania court. Id.
Subsequently, the husband moved to Utah and fell behind in child support payments. Id.
Therefore, Pennsylvania sent a request to Utah for enforcement of the past due child
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support. Id The State of Utah, in turn, filed a motion and order to show cause pursuant
to UIFSA. Id (Please notice that Jacoby involves a "two-state" proceeding, not a "onestate" proceeding.) The husband in response filed a motion requesting that the court
apply Utah Child Support Guidelines and reduce his child support obligation. Id The
court entered judgment against the husband, and the husband appealed. Id On appeal,
the husband made two arguments that are relevant to the situation at hand.
First, the husband argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Id. at 943-4. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed and held that the husband's brief
contained "no legal analysis or authority to support his argument." Id at 944. There as
here, Mr. Case cites no correct legal authority that takes subject matter jurisdiction from
the District Court. Although Mr. Case cites § 78-45f-611, this statute does take away
subject matter jurisdiction from the District Court. This case involves a "one-state"
proceeding - not a "two-state" proceeding, and so § 78-45f-611 does not apply. It is well
settled that the District Court has subject matter jurisdiction over child support actions as
discussed previously. As such, subject matter jurisdiction is proper in the case at hand.
Second, in Jacoby the husband argued the District Court erred by failing to modify
his support obligations imposed by the Virginia decree. Id at 945. The Court of Appeals
correctly applied § 78-45f-611, as a "two-state" proceeding was involved. See id. In its
application of the statute, the Court refused to modify the support order because the
statute requires that the "petitioner" must be the party seeking modification - not the
"respondent." Id In that case, because the husband was the "respondent" and not the
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"petitioner/5 the court did not allow the modification. Id. In the aspect that the court was
properly able to apply § U.C.A. 78-45f-611, and therefore Jacoby is not like the case at
bar. This is because a "two-state55 proceeding was involved in Jacoby, as opposed to a
"one-state55 proceeding like in the instant case. Mr. Case also cites, Gentzel v. Williams
in support of his argument that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 965 P.2d 855
(Kan. Ct. App ] 998) (husband who had relocated to Kansas wanted to modify a divorce
decree originating from Arizona where wife had relocated to Texas). However, this case
involved an application of the "two-state55 provisions of UIFSA. This case also is not
applicable in the instant matter because it involved "two-state55 proceedings where § 7845f-611 is applicable, whereas this case involves a "one-state55 in which § 78-45f-611 is
not applicable.
In sum, Mr. Case's argument that the Utah District Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction is completely without merit. The District Court has subject matter
jurisdiction conferred upon it to hear child support matters by statute and case law as
reference above. Mr. Case cites no authority that removes subject matter jurisdiction
from the Utah District Court, and the authority he does cite in his argument is fatally
incorrect because it applies only to "two-state5' proceedings under UIFSA - not "onestate55 proceedings as is the case here. As such, jurisdiction is proper and Mr. Case's
appeal should be dismissed.
Mr. Case also implies that Mrs. Case committed some sort of wrong-doing because
in her Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment she addressed the
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Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) but did not address
UIFSA, which governs the situation at hand. Brief for Appellant at 20. While it is true
that Mrs. Case only cited only the UCCJEA in her initial Memorandum, it is definately
not error for the court to consider the custody statute when addressing child support
jurisdiction. In fact, this is exactly what the Kentucky Supreme Court held in McCorick
v. McCormick. 623 S.W.2d 909 (Kentucky 1981). In that case, the court was addressing
whether to modify a child support order. Id. at 909. The court proceeded to set forth the
"home state" requirement, and the "substantial evidence'V'significant connection"
requirements contained in the child custody statute, and then stated that "in the interest of
common sense the same [child custody] factors must be considered in determining
whether this state's courts should exercise jurisdiction in an action for the modification of
child support." k l at 909-10. As such, contrary to what Mr. Case states, the child
custody statute can shed light on whether asserting jurisdiction for child support is
appropriate.
In any event, Mrs. Case's reference to the UCCJEA and her lack of reference
UIFSA in her initial Memorandum is not reversible error. The District Court's decision
should only be overturned for error if the error is "reversible." Harmless error is not
grounds for reversal. Because the district court had proper subject matter jurisdiction to
hear the case anyway, any weight the district court gave to the child custody statute is
harmless at best and not grounds for reversal.
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POINT TWO: The trial court was proper in granting the motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because of Mr.
Case's complete failure to respond to the motion.
Mr. Case's second issue for review is whether summary judgment was proper
pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In his argument that
summary judgment was improper, Mr. Case brings up three points (some of which are
discussed at other points in his brief). Brief for Appellant at 25-27. The points Mr. Case
brings up are as follows: (1) That summary judgment was improper because the District
Court allegedly lacked subject matter jurisdiction. (2) That principles of equity
supposedly should have prevented summary judgment due to Mrs. Case's citing of the
UCCJEA instead of UIFSA in her initial Memorandum. (3) That summary judgment
was allegedly improper because although Mr. Case totally failed to respond to the Motion
for Summary Judgment, his Answer nevertheless articulated questions of fact that should
have been considered in the Summary Judgment context. None of Mr. Case's arguments
are persuasive, however, and he cites no correct authority that supports his contention that
summary judgment was improper. Therefore, the District Court's entry of Summary
Judgment should be affirmed.
First, Mr. Case argues that summary judgment was improper because he alleges
that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. However, as discussed in the
first part of this Brief, the District Court did have proper subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah statutes and case law. As stated previously, the Utah Code and the Utah
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Constitution specify that the district court has "original jurisdiction in all matters except
as limited by this constitution or by statute (emphasis added)." UTAH CONST. ART. VII §
5; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3-4(1) (1953). In addition, the Uniform Civil Liability for
Support Act, which has been adopted by Utah in Title 78, chapter 45 specifically grants
the "district court" subject matter jurisdiction to hear "all proceedings" involving child
support. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-6. Furthermore, Utah case law has specifically held
that "the district court... has exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to divorce, child
custody, paternity, and child support." Child Support Enforcement. 888 P.2d at 693. Mr.
Case cites no authority that removes this subject matter jurisdiction from the district
court, although he again cites § 78-45f-611 (which does not apply as previously
discussed). As such, Mr. Case's first argument fails and summary judgment was proper.
Secondly, Mr. Case argues that principles of equity make summary judgment
improper because Mrs. Case cited UCCJEA instead of UIFSA in her initial
Memorandum. Also stated earlier in this brief, some courts have considered the child
custody statute when considering whether jurisdiction is proper in child support matters.
McCorick v. McCormick. 623 S.W.2d 909 (Kentucky 1981). However, Mrs. Case does
agree that UIFSA is controlling, and further asserts that when UIFSA is applied to the
case, the court still has proper jurisdiction (as discussed under point one of this brief). In
contrast, if anyone is acting with unclean hands, it is Mr. Case, who relentlessly argues
that § 78-45f-611 applies when it clearly does not due to this matter being a "one-state"
proceeding under UIFSA (which is explicitly set forth in § 78-45f-202). Mrs. Case has
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informed Mr. Case of the existence of section 78-45f-202, and instead of addressing the
statute, he ignores it. As such, Mr. Case's second argument fails and summary judgment
was proper.
Thirdly, Mr. Case argues that summary judgment was not proper because the
District Court should have known that certain facts may have been in dispute due to "the
assertions set forth by Mr. Case in his answer.. ." Brief for Appellant at 26. However,
Mr. Case cites absolutely no authority in support of his position that factual disputes
contained in a party's answer are a sufficient response to a Motion for Summary
Judgment. However, it is well supported in Utah by both statute and case law that if there
is a factual dispute in the summary judgment context, that the responding party must set
forth the dispute in a response to the motion. If a party ignores or fails to respond to the
motion, he is indicating to the court that he agrees with the motion and summary
judgment is proper despite the contents of the Answer. Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure states:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response by affidavits or otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him (emphasis
added).
Id. This rule specifically permits entry of Summary Judgment when a responding party
does not respond. If summary judgment is opposed and if there is a genuine issue of fact,
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then the responding party must advise the court in affidavits and/or memorandum. Mr.
Case cannot expect the District Court to read his mind.
Moreover, numerous Utah Supreme Court cases explicitly require a response to the
motion if a party wants to articulate any factual disputes. Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224
(Utah 1983); Thornock v. Cook. 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979); Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker
Motor Co.. 537 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1975); United Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Willerv. 21 Utah 2d
279 (1968); Dupler v. Yates. 10 Utah 2d 251 (1960). These cases forbid responding
parties from relying upon allegations or denials in their pleadings to create issues of fact
in the summary judgment context, which is exactly what Mr. Case is doing. See id. The
above-referenced cases unquestionably hold that allegations or denials in the pleadings
are an insufficient basis to oppose summary judgment. Id. A response must be made or
the motion for summary judgment can properly be granted. Id Here, Mrs. Case
presented the motion in proper form and supported by affidavit and memorandum. Mr.
Case did not respond in any way to the motion. The District Court accordingly held,
"[Mr. Case's] complete failure to file an opposing affidavit, which could have raised
factual issues, opened the door for an adverse ruling. Summary judgment was
appropriate." Ruling on Motion for Relief from Judgment, page 2. Thus, since Mr. Case
did not challenge the motion, summary judgment was proper and the child support order
should be affirmed.
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POINT THREE: A showing of substantial change of circumstances is not required
to establish a child support order pursuant to section 78-45-7,2(3) of the Utah Code
when (1) the initial decree "reserved" the issue of support and (2) the decree
provided that a showing of change in circumstances would not be required for a
future modification.
The third issue in this appeal is whether Mrs. Case must demonstrate a substantial
change in circumstances in order to have her award of child support stand, when her
divorce decree did not order child support but "reserved" the issue. While it is true that
generally a "substantial change in circumstances" must be made before a support order
can be modified (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.2(7)(a)), the District Court was correct in
deciding that no such showing should be required where the parties "reserved" the child
support issue and where no award of support was made in the decree.
In support of this position, the statutes of the State of Utah do not require Mrs.
Case to demonstrate a substantial change of circumstances in a unique situation like this.
§ 78-45-7.2(3) permits a Court to deviate from the change in circumstances requirement if
the Court has made a finding that supports the conclusion that compliance with the
guidelines would be "unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interests of a child . . . " In
this case, the District Court articulated many reasons in the written Findings of Fact that
demonstrate that requiring a substantial change of circumstances would be "unjust,
inappropriate, and not in the best interests of the childfren]" in this case. Id First, as the
District Court noted, this case is unique because the California "reserved" the issue of
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child support until "further order of the court." Ruling on Motion for Relief from
Judgment at 3. The issue of child support that was previously "reserved" was now being
addressed, and no change of circumstances should be articulated to address the "reserved"
issue. Id. Second, as the District Court also noted, the California Decree did not set forth
specific findings of fact from which a modification could be based. IcL In order for a
party to demonstrate a "change" there must be a starting point from which the change
originates. See id. The California Decree made no findings of income or employment or
anything else that would give a court a starting point to determine if the circumstances
had changed. This made it impossible for Mrs. Case to show a "change" had occurred.
For these reasons, the District Court was correct and justified by statute in not requiring a
showing of substantial change of circumstance.
A very similar case was decided in precisely the same way in a Michigan court.
Ebel v. Brown. 246 N.W.2d 379 (Mich Ct. App. 1976). In Ebel a husband and wife were
divorced and their decree stated that, "that the plaintiff pay the defendant the sum of $none- per month per child for the care and support of the two minor children." Id at 380.
After the parties had been divorced for several years, the plaintiff wife sued her exhusband for child support. See id. At issue was whether the court could modify a divorce
decree that provided for no child support without a showing of change in circumstances.
Id. The court held that "no change of circumstances need be shown where the court is
involved with a decree of support not specified in the original decree, the record need
only indicate that the circumstances of the parties and the welfare of the child require
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support." Id at 381. In then case at hand, there is an even more compelling reason to not
require a showing of change in circumstances because the parties (1) specifically
"reserved" the child support issue and (2) specifically agreed that a showing of change of
circumstances would not be required. As such, a showing of substantial change in
circumstances should not be required here because the original decree did not provide for
support, but "reserved" the issue.
Other authorities also support this position. In the Corpus Juris Secundum, we
read, "[a] foreign divorce decree which does not provide for child support does not
preclude a subsequent decree of child support in another state under the Uniform
Recriprocal Enforcement of Support Act [which was the predecessor of UIFSA]." 27C
C.J.S. Divorce § 828 (1986) (footnote stating, "No change of circumstances need be
shown to warrant award of child support if divorce decree entered in foreign state does
not provide for child support; record need only indicate that circumstances of parents and
welfare of child require support."). This clarifies the position that if there is no award of
child support in the decree, then a substantial change of circumstances is not required. As
such, since the California Decree did not address child support, but "reserved" it, no
showing of change in circumstances should be required in this case.
In addition to the above considerations, the Utah Court of Appeals should also
consider the pterin language of the parties' decree (and the incorporated Settlement
Agreement) in determining whether Mrs. Case is required to show a material change of
circumstances to obtain a support order. In Utah, divorce decrees are interpreted in
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accordance with "established rules of contract interpretation." Taylor v. Hansen, 958
P.2d 923 (Utah, 1998). In determining the meaning of a contract, the Court should look
at the contract's "plain language" to determine the agreement. Prince v. Bear River
Mutual Insurance Co., 56 P.3d 524 (Utah 2002). Here, the plain language of the decree
and settlement agreement are clearly stated. The marital settlement agreement reads,
"[t]he parties stipulate that, if the child support award is less than the mandatory
minimum level, no change of circumstances need be demonstrated to obtain a
modification of the child support award to the applicable mandatory minimum level or
above." Marital Settlement Agreement at 5-6. This language is incorporated into the
parties' decree on page 2 of the decree, item (1), which states, "Child support is ordered as
set forth in the attached Marital settlement agreement..." Additionally, Mr. Case himself
states in his brief that the Court should look at the parties' intent. See Brief for Appellant
at 18. Here, the parties' intent is clear that Mrs. Case was not going to be required to
show a substantial change in circumstances to subsequently obtain a child support award.
To now require Mrs. Case to prove a change in circumstances when she and Mr. Case
agreed that this would not be required violates the parties' intent, the parties' agreement,
and the parties' decree. As such, the court should not require a showing of material
change in circumstances in this matter.
In addition to the foregoing arguments, public policy requires that this court affirm
the child support order. Children have an inherent right to be supported. The Utah
Supreme Court has held that, "[o]ne thing is certain: The right to barter away a child's
41

claim to support is not a commodity in the market overt..." Wasescha v. Waescha, 548
P.2d 895, 896 (Utah 1976). Even if Mrs. Case had agreed that Mr. Case would never
have to pay child support, it is not her right to do that and she has not done that. The right
to support is the right of the children. The children at issue need to be supported by their
father. Mrs. Case has been forced to accept assistance from the government for her
children, because she simply cannot support the children on her own. These children
have an inherent right to be supported by their father, who has chosen not to do so, and
who is trying to hide behind state lines. Instead, Mr. Case has chosen to fight his ex-wife
"tooth and naif to squirm out of his obligation. Public policy demands that the Court
affirm the support obligation.
POINT FOUR: Mrs. Case is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs
pursuant to section 30-3-3 of the Utah Code to aid her in defense of this appeal.
As issue is whether Mrs. Case is entitled to attorney's fees and costs from Mr.
Case pursuant to § 30-3-3 of the Utah Code. This section of the code permits a party to
recover attorney's fees and costs when they are defending an action. In the instant case,
Mrs. Case has informed Mr. Case through prior pleadings that his arguments are
erronous, but he still persists in pushing this appeal (without countering her arguments,
which makes his appeal seem frivilous - also grounds for attorneys fees and costs). This
has resulted in a great financial hardship on Mrs. Case and she has been unable to pay her
fees as they become due. The fact that she is also not receiving child support makes the
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situation even worse. As such, Mrs. Case is entitled to recover her reasonable attorney's
fees and costs involved in this action.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Case argues that the Utah District Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
the child support action at issue. As discussed previously in this brief, Utah Statute and
case law is clear that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over child support
matter. Mr. Case cites section 78-45f-611 of the Utah Code to support his argument, but
this section does not even apply as specifically stated in section 78-45f-202. Mr. Case is
grasping at straws to evade his child support obligation on a technicality that is nonexistant. The Utah District Court has proper subject matter jurisdiction.
Mr. Case also argues that the Utah District Court erred in entering summary
judgment against him. However, it is well-settled in the law that when a party fails to
respond to the motion, summary judgment is proper. Mr. Case cites no authority that
contradicts this. He simply attempts to rely on the allegations contained in his Answer,
which he cannot properly rely on in the summary judgment context. The district court
was correct in entering summary judgment.
Finally, Mr. Case argues that Mrs. Case should be required to demonstrate a
substantial change in circumstances to get her child support award. While typically a
showing such as this is required, the District Court was proper in deviating from the
general rule in this case. Here, the parties "reserved" the issue of child support in their
divorce decree and further agreed that no showing of change in circumstances would be
required for a subsequent child support order. Section § 78-45-7.2(7)(a) of the Utah Code
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permits the court to deviate from the substantial change in circumstances requirement
where such a requirement would be "inappropriate, unjust, or not in the best interests of
the child.'5 This was precisely the case here and is why the District Court was proper in
its ruling.
For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the District Court should be affirmed on all

Otth
points. Respectfully submitted this _/

day of April, 2004.

Heather M. Jensen
Attorney for Appellee/Petitioner

MAILING CERTIFICATE

qj>n

On this / - ^ dAa y of April, 2004, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief
of Appellee were deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
David R. Hartwig
Attorney for Appellant
1817 South Main Street #17
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Heather M. Jensen
Attorney for Appellee/Petitioner

45

ADDENDUM
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30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees — Temporary alimony.
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to establish an order of
custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may
order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other
party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order may include provision for costs
of the action.
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of
property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon determining that the party
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited
fees against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not
awarding fees.
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to provide money, during the
pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other party and of any children in
the custody of the other party.
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or judgment may be amended
during the course of the action or in the final order or judgment.
Amended by Chapter 255, 2001 General Session
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78-45f-304. Duties of initiating tribunal.
(1) Upon the filing of a petition authorized by this chapter, an initiating tribunal of this state shall
forward three copies of the petition and its accompanying documents:
(a) to the responding tribunal or appropriate support enforcement agency in the responding state; or
(b) if the identity of the responding tribunal is unknown, to the state information agency of the
responding state with a request that they be forwarded to the appropriate tribunal and that receipt be
acknowledged.
(2) If a responding state has not enacted this chapter or a law or procedure substantially similar to this
chapter, a tribunal of this state may issue a certificate or other document and make findings required by the
law of the responding state. If the responding state is a foreign jurisdiction, the tribunal may specify the
amount of support sought and provide the other documents necessary to satisfy the requirements of the
responding state.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 232, 1997 General Session
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78-45f-305. Duties and powers of responding tribunal
(1) When a responding tribunal of this state receives a petition or comparable pleading from an initiating
tribunal or directly pursuant to Subsection 78-45f-301(2)(c), it shall cause the petition or pleading to be
filed and notify the petitioner where and when it was filed.
(2) A responding tribunal of this state, to the extent otherwise authorized by law, may do one or more of
the following:
(a) issue or enforce a support order, modify a child support order, or render a judgment to determine
parentage;
(b) order an obligor to comply with a support order, specifying the amount and the manner of
compliance;
(c) order income withholding;
(d) determine the amount of any arrearages and specify a method of payment;
(e) enforce orders by civil or criminal contempt, or both;
(f) set aside property for satisfaction of the support order;
(g) place liens and order execution on the obligor's property;
(h) order an obligor to keep the tribunal informed of the obligor's current residential address, telephone
number, employer, address of employment, and telephone number at the place of employment;
(i) issue a bench warrant for an obligor who has failed after proper notice to appear at a hearing ordered
by the tribunal and enter the bench warrant in any local and state computer systems for criminal warrants;
(j) order the obligor to seek appropriate employment by specified methods;
(k) award reasonable attorneys' fees and other fees and costs; and
(1) grant any other available remedy.
(3) A responding tribunal of this state shall include in a support order issued under this chapter, or in the
documents accompanying the order, the calculations on which the support order is based.
(4) A responding tribunal of this state may not condition the payment of a support order issued under
this chapter upon compliance by a party with provisions for parent-time.
(5) If a responding tribunal of this state issues an order under this chapter, the tribunal shall send a copy
of the order to the petitioner and the respondent and to the initiating tribunal, if any.
Amended by Chapter 255, 2001 General Session
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